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Abstract: In 2004 while fleeing upheaval in Haiti, 81 year-old 
Joseph Dantica died while being detained by the U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security. In seeking temporary asylum, Dantica 
became subject to regulations that can be assumed to have precipi-
tated his death. This article discusses Edwidge Danticat’s Brother, 
I’m Dying, a memoir in which Danticat negotiates how best to 
establish her uncle’s grievability as a subject. Using Judith Butler’s 
Precarious Life and Frames of War as theoretical touchpoints, this 
article explores Danticat’s manipulation of narrative form as an 
interrogation of the efficacy of emotional appeals. In viewing 
Danticat’s narrative choices as her way to manage sites for em-
pathetic engagement, this article questions the complexities and 
limits of affective citizenship.
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
In a siren, the individual muscles of a life collapsing,
as waves, stuttering on some harm,
your fingers may flutter in the viscera of an utter stranger
I wake up to it, open as doorways,
Breathless as a coming hour, and undone (Brand 63)
Having already achieved immense success with her fiction, Edwidge 
Danticat has recently turned more and more towards autobiographical 
non-fiction. In particular, After the Dance: A Walk through Carnival in 
ariel: a review of international english literature
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Jacmel, Haiti (2002), Brother, I’m Dying (2007), and Create Dangerously: 
The Immigrant Artist at Work (2010) are all focussed on expressing 
Danticat’s own experiences and that of her family. Although she suggests 
that she is “going to ease back into fiction slowly again” (Shea 192)—
and she has begun to do so with, for instance, her recent children’s book 
Eight Days (2010) and her recent novel Claire of the Sea Light (2013)—
her shift towards the autobiographical has allowed Danticat a venue for 
further exploring the ethics involved in remembering and representing 
past traumatic events, a theme common throughout her body of work. 
In Create Dangerously, Danticat asserts, “Grappling with memory is, I 
believe, one of many complicated Haitian obsessions” (63). In Danticat’s 
work, this “grappling with memory” has been witnessed in the narra-
tive of a daughter’s need to come to terms with her mother’s abuse in 
Breath, Eyes, Memory, in the re-telling of the 1937 massacre of Haitians 
in The Farming of Bones, and in the compilation of accounts of a former 
Tonton Macoute in The Dew Breaker. In Danticat’s negotiation of the 
processes and limits of memory, to “grapple with” becomes an especially 
apt description, bearing as it does references to both physical and mental 
sparring. As much as “grappling” is “[t]o grip as in wrestling; to seize 
with hands and arms” (“Grapple,” Def. 8b) and “[t]o encounter hand 
to hand; to battle or struggle with” (“Grapple,” Def. 8c), it is also “[t]o 
try to overcome (a difficulty, etc.); to try to accomplish, . . . ; to try to 
deal with (a question, etc.); to try to solve (a problem, etc.)” (“Grapple,” 
Def. 8e). As such, “grappling with memory” can be both to struggle 
against someone—the forces by which memory has been quashed—and 
to struggle against oneself. 
In Danticat’s recent turn towards the autobiographical, particularly 
in Brother, I’m Dying, this need to “grapple” becomes more personal, 
her struggle with memory and the ethics of commemoration more dire. 
Brother, I’m Dying tells a story of the collision of three life-altering events: 
her father’s terminal illness, the upcoming birth of her first child, and 
her uncle’s unexpected, tragic, and by most accounts wrongful death 
while in the custody of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
Caught in 2004 at a moment post-9/11 when the United States per-
ceived its borders to be threateningly porous, Danticat’s uncle found 
31
Empa the t i c  Engagemen t  i n  Dan t i c a t ’s  Bro th e r,  I ’m  Dy in g
his simple request for temporary asylum precipitating his death. In as-
suming this three-part focus, Brother, I’m Dying requires Danticat to 
take on multiple positions as life writer. As both autobiographer and 
biographer, Danticat constructs a narrative where she is at times an in-
terior consciousness sharing her own feelings, at times a somewhat om-
niscient narrator inside her father’s or uncle’s mindscape, and at times an 
overtly distanced reporter compiling the verbal and/or written accounts 
of others. The shift in particular away from a detailed, narrativized di-
egetic world to a listing of quoted facts has become a defining feature of 
this text, noted in almost all scholarship on it. As others have observed, 
a narrative in which Danticat felt comfortable entering into the minds 
of her subjects—either sharing what they have said about their thoughts 
and feelings or even anticipating what they must have been feeling—be-
comes a narrative of miniscule facts and quoted documents when she 
describes her uncle’s detention and eventual death. 
For the most part, the shift in narrative perspective and style has pre-
viously been explained as an example of a narrative’s formal features 
echoing its content. The change in narrative can, for instance, be said to 
showcase the harshness of the bureaucracy that Joseph Dantica encoun-
tered when he sought temporary asylum (Danticat, Brother 215) in the 
United States.1 Elizabeth Walcott-Hackshaw briefly describes this shift 
of style as “reproducing the clinical manner in which the authorities 
dealt with the case of Joseph Dantica” (76). Kezia Page similarly suggests 
that the shift towards offering “a staccato of information” (47) repre-
sents “the emotional exhaustion of the experience” (50). Nicole Waller 
expands on these ideas by assessing this shift in narrative as a sign of lost 
discourse space, one that argues against theories that depict borderland 
spaces as sites of “enunciation” (359).
In contributing to this critical discussion of the significance of the 
text’s shift in narrative perspective and style, my reading will explore 
Danticat’s narrative choices as an interrogation of the efficacy of emo-
tional appeals. As I will argue, Edwidge Danticat’s memoir, particularly 
the parts about her uncle’s detention and death, is geared towards dis-
rupting discursive “frames” (see Butler, Frames) that render immigrants 
and asylum seekers vulnerable to scapegoating.2 In building upon 
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Wendy Knepper’s linking of Brother, I’m Dying with Judith Butler’s dis-
cussions of precarity, I argue that Danticat’s manipulation of narrative 
form is a means of foregrounding this precarity and thereby of crafting 
a space in which precarity can be critiqued. As the following reading 
will develop, Danticat’s narrative choices, by in part serving to manage 
sites for empathetic engagement, enable her not only to argue effectively 
for her uncle’s grievability but also to explore whether the story of one 
person, a precarious other, can disrupt the ideological frames that cast 
some as having lives worth grieving and others as having ungrievable 
non-lives. The power of life writing or testimony should be in its abil-
ity to humanize a larger issue through the story of one individual. This 
humanization is what can motivate social change. But in a post-9/11 
context, Danticat’s text must, while giving voice to precarious others, 
question—in fact doubt—whether the story of an individual can still 
have the affective power that tends to be ascribed to the genre of life 
writing. Consequently, as will be shown, Danticat’s text, in its manipu-
lation of narrative form, largely functions to observe and interrogate the 
complexities and limits of affective citizenship. 
* * *
In Precarious Life, Judith Butler argues: 
Some lives are grievable, and others are not; the differential al-
location of grievability that decides what kind of subject is and 
must be grieved, and which kind of subject must not, operates 
to produce and maintain certain exclusionary conceptions of 
who is normatively human: what counts as a livable life and a 
grievable death? (xiv-xv) 
To the U.S. immigration system, Joseph Dantica’s life was not one that 
counted, his death not one to grieve. Edwidge Danticat seeks to cor-
rect this view, using the genre of memoir to construct her uncle, an 
asylum-seeker, as a viable subject with a worthwhile life and voice. To 
do so, Danticat must carefully navigate the frames of her discourse space 
and thereby construct her text’s rhetorical effect so that she can gener-
ate empathetic engagement with Dantica’s situation, not motivate mere 
pity nor perpetuate disdain for asylum seekers. In depicting her uncle’s 
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experience, she is putting her text in conversation with recent critical 
discourse that not only privileges empathy as a means of raising social 
consciousness but also conceives of grief and mourning as potential mo-
tivators of social change. 
In Precarious Life, for instance, Judith Butler explores how grief can 
function to build community instead of serving as “a cry for war” (xii). 
Suggesting that grief foregrounds the importance of our relationships 
with others, Butler argues that it can by extension make us aware of “our 
collective responsibility for the physical lives of one another” (Precarious 
30). As Maureen Moynagh further develops, the experience of grief 
offers “new perspective on and new understandings of lost objects” (Eng 
and Kazanjian qtd. in Moynagh 58), a new understanding that allows 
mere “complaint” to transform into actionable “plaint,” a seeking of 
social change (60). By extension, grief can become a “mechanism that 
helps us (re) construct identity and take our dead with us to the various 
battles we must wage in their name—and in our names” (Munoz qtd. 
in Dhar 35; emphasis added). The intimate connection forged through 
grief between the “they” who are mourned and the “us” who do the 
mourning (and subsequently, the “us” who are made aware of their own 
precarity) can, in this view, become a key impetus for social change. 
Grief is thus put in the service of forming a sense of affective citizen-
ship whereby “emotional geographies, and the socio-cultural dimen-
sions of emotions .  .  . , each .  .  . carries implications for theorizing 
community and citizenship” (Brydon 1003). I use the term “citizenship” 
here with some trepidation. “Citizenship” does imply a certain sense 
of national belonging, a belonging in and also to nation, a belonging 
that is often denied to immigrants even after they become naturalized 
citizens. Nevertheless, my view of “affective citizenship” seeks to take 
“citizenship” outside of its roots in nation and view it instead as a marker 
of one’s humanity. In other words, the “citizenship” of “affective citi-
zenship” suggests instead a belonging in and responsibility towards the 
broader community of humankind. To be human, emotionally engaged, 
and aware of one’s responsibilities to one’s fellow humans is to be able to 
be a “citizen” in this use of the term. In fact, because emotions “actively 
engage the subject in a relationship with the external world,” (Fajans 
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qtd. in Brydon 1000), emotions can be the means through which com-
munity across differences can be forged. Emotions “tear us from our-
selves, bind us to others, transport us, undo us, implicate us in lives 
that are not are [sic] own” (Butler, Precarious 25); they thereby can be 
deployed to develop a more ethical approach to alterity. 
Danticat’s Brother, I’m Dying itself largely becomes a case study for 
this exploration of the efficacy of emotion and empathy. There are, after 
all, complexities to and limits of deploying emotions as a means of ethi-
cal engagement with difference. For instance, the empathy that Butler 
envisions as attainable through an acceptance of our common precarity 
must still be charged with the responsibility of respecting difference. 
As Dominick LaCapra argues, the experience of empathy must be ac-
companied by an experience of unsettlement, of discomfort in trying to 
occupy another’s experience. He writes that one must be able to “put . . . 
oneself in the other’s position while recognizing the difference of that 
position and hence not taking the other’s place” (78). Alison Landsberg 
similarly suggests that a “practice of empathy” must involve “finding 
ways to inhabit other people’s memories as other people’s memories and 
thereby respect . . . and recogniz[e] difference” (24; emphasis in origi-
nal). One threat of coming “undone” in the wake of another’s pain, the 
situation that the epigraph of this paper describes, is that such emo-
tional investment in the experience of another may not respect the ulti-
mate unknowability of another’s trauma. 
While not respecting the unknowability of someone else’s experience 
can be ethically problematic, so too can feeling emotion for someone 
while maintaining one’s privileged separation. Empathy’s kin, compas-
sion, which is tied to pity, has been explored by Lauren Berlant as in-
volving “good intentions [that] can sometimes be said to be aggressive” 
(6). Although compassion can intimate an awareness of another’s pain, 
it does not always emerge to dismantle the power relations involved in 
distinctions between “us” and “them.” As Berlant observes, “compas-
sion is a term denoting privilege: the sufferer is over there” (4; empha-
sis in original).3 If all Brother, I’m Dying provokes is compassion for a 
situation like that of Joseph Dantica, then it cannot fully accomplish 
its goal of advocacy for systemic change. As Jo Collins explores in her 
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discussion of Danticat’s The Dew Breaker, the trauma of others can be 
problematically appropriated, put to use “for a celebratory rhetoric of 
audience empathy” (14) which allows an audience “‘to recuperate our 
liberal guilt for Haiti’ (207) from a safe distance” (Martin Munro qtd. 
in Collins 14).4 
All told, if provoking an empathy that does not observe one’s proper 
separation from an event or individual is just as problematic as pro-
voking a compassion that allows for one to preserve a privileged dis-
tance, then a text such as Danticat’s must concern itself with carefully 
managing its affect. Danticat must not be perceived as disrespecting the 
unknowability of her uncle’s experience, nor can she allow the audi-
ence to feel an unselfconscious intimacy with him. Nevertheless, while 
preserving a respectful distance from Dantica’s reality, Danticat must 
all the while ensure that her audience connects with him, his other-
ness minimized. Of course, this ability to establish connection across 
difference relies entirely on whether or not a text is met with an audi-
ence who can be affected by its emotional appeal. Because only certain 
lives are grievable, as suggested by Butler, only certain narratives can 
employ pathos and still hope to be persuasive. Politicians may be able 
to “regularly use emotion to try to gain the interest and support of the 
electorate” (Johnson 495), but can Edwidge Danticat, an immigrant 
telling the story of an asylum seeker, count on pathos as a successful 
appeal? The online commentary in response to a 60 Minutes broadcast 
about Joseph Dantica’s death and the treatment of other asylum seek-
ers would certainly suggest not. In telling the story of her uncle on 60 
Minutes, Danticat’s grief is overt; her own feelings that are muted in the 
memoir itself are made apparent by the tears that disrupt her descrip-
tion of Dantica’s death: “he died so alone .  .  . and after being treated 
like an animal.” Neither the overtness of her grief nor the described 
trauma faced by other detainees featured in the story seem to serve as 
persuasive to many viewers. With the online commentary about this 
broadcast dominated by opinions such as “GUESS WHAT WHINER 
BABY ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS. . . . If you don’t like the treatment 
you get in our country, THEN GO HOME!!!” (LEGALamericangirl), 
it becomes apparent that soliciting an emotional connection to those in-
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humanely treated by the immigration detention system remains a hard 
sell to many.5 
From the discourse surrounding this 60 Minutes broadcast it would 
appear that Butler’s desire for individuals to appreciate the precarity of 
others through an awareness of their own is an ideal that may not be 
easily realized. The online commentary regarding this broadcast demon-
strates a clear awareness of precarity in American culture, a precarity par-
ticularly surrounding the issue of affordable medical care. Stepdancer58, 
for instance, writes: “There are plenty of needs and it would be ideal if 
we could meet every one, but your story ignored the fact that so many 
hard working Americans can’t even afford health insurance for them-
selves or their families.” Proudcitize1 offers: “There are millions of fam-
ilies in this country who have no medical insurance and no access to the 
basics of medical care. You want their hard earned tax money to pay for 
medical care for someone who came into this country illegally?” From 
these comments, which express sentiments prevalent in much of the 
online commentary, one can see that an awareness of one’s own precar-
ity does not necessarily motivate an empathetic connection to another 
person. Instead, one’s knowledge of another’s precarity competes with 
one’s own experience of vulnerability, thus compromising one’s willing-
ness to forge an unconditional empathetic bond. 
So what can the impact of the story of an individual be if it cannot 
guarantee the creation of an empathetic connection across difference? 
The assumption has long been that the testimony of an individual can 
humanize a socio-political issue, that the testimony of an individual 
provides the story to which others may relate and thereby be moved to 
appreciate the issue, if not in fact be motivated to work towards change. 
John Beverley, in his groundbreaking work on testimonio, writes that 
“a literature of personal witness and involvement [is] designed to make 
the cause of these movements known to the outside world, to attract 
recruits” (32). Yet, is there now growing doubt that the story of an indi-
vidual can serve as this impetus for change? Sustainable4, for example, 
critiques the 60 Minutes broadcast for getting caught up in the stories 
of individuals while ignoring the even bigger picture, a bigger picture 
involving the costs of “immigrant inmates”: 
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Rather, though, than stress this costly impact on the U.S. 
system, CBS . . . provides a story about an illegal immigrant, 
Francisco Castaneda, who had penile cancer, not getting 
prompt (very expensive) treatment. That illustrates the kind of 
general reporting often used in covering the complexity of im-
migration issues. Rather than look at the macrocosmic impacts 
of rapidly-growing millions, the 60 minutes’ reporter looks at 
microcosmic examples involving individual immigrants im-
pacted by policy.
Sustainable4’s statements may come out of an ideological stance con-
cerned with the effect of immigration on American citizens, hence a 
position from which he/she may not want to empathize with detainees 
like Dantica. Nevertheless, even Butler’s recent Frames of War expresses 
a lost faith in the power of an individual to have affective impact. Given 
the growing doubt that an individual’s story can motivate change, how 
can Danticat’s humanization of her uncle through life writing have 
an impact? Butler’s Precarious Life may have suggested the inability to 
“muster the ‘we’ except by finding the way in which I am tied to ‘you’” 
(Precarious 49), but Frames of War backs off from this ideal of accom-
plishing social change through a connection between individuals.6 The 
opening of Frames of War signals this shift of attention away from the in-
dividual towards the conditions the individual faces: “if one apprehends 
a life as precarious one will resolve to protect that life or secure the con-
ditions for its persistence and flourishing” (Frames 2; emphasis added). 
There is an interesting duality expressed by the “or,” a duality that imag-
ines a public who may not be affected by thinking about the singular 
“life” at stake but who may be affected by considering the broader “con-
ditions” that may affect that life. Although Butler holds onto the idea 
that lives are lived in relation to others, she seemingly moves away from 
emotional attachment as the source for connection across difference. 
She writes that there may be “a dependency on people we know, or barely 
know, or know not at all” (Frames 14; emphasis in original), but “[t]hese 
are not necessarily relations of love or even of care, but constitute obliga-
tions towards others” (Frames 14). Obligation may still be an emotion, 
but it reflects more a forced than desired attachment. 
38
Ve ron i c a  Au s t en
In her figuring of obligation as the means through which systems that 
“minimize precariousness” (Frames 21) can be achieved, Butler turns 
away from the importance of the singularity of an individual that she 
had earlier foregrounded in Precarious Life. In Precarious Life, emo-
tions—particularly grief—could be a means of connecting an “I” to a 
“you” (Precarious 49). But in Frames of War, Butler shifts to asserting 
that “[p]recariousness has to be grasped not simply as a feature of this or 
that life, but as a generalized condition” (Frames 22; emphasis in origi-
nal). She continues by stating that ensuring the grievability of another 
“does not require that we come to know the singularity of every person 
who is at risk or who has, indeed, already been risked. Rather, it means 
that policy needs to understand precariousness as a shared condition” 
(Frames 28). There is a movement here that suggests a lost faith in the 
possibility of felt, albeit imagined, personalized relationships between 
individuals. Instead of Precarious Life’s assumption that we individu-
ally can be committed to each other, all Butler requires of her public in 
Frames of War is a commitment to humane conditions. As she asserts, 
“[o]ur obligations are precisely to the conditions that make life possible, 
not to ‘life itself ’” (Frames 23).7 
The contradictions and ambivalences suggested by the shift between 
Precarious Life and Frames of War illustrate the difficulty of the terrain 
that Danticat’s Brother, I’m Dying must traverse. Danticat’s memoir 
must navigate questions regarding the efficacy of emotional appeals, and 
by extension, questions regarding the efficacy of an individual’s story 
to produce empathetic engagement. Consistent with a suspicion of the 
impact of appeals to pathos, Danticat’s movement away from narrativ-
izing events towards quoting written reports can in part be seen as a 
means of heightening the persuasiveness of her appeal. She may con-
ceive of her audience as a favourable one; in an interview, she states, 
“I envision as my audience anyone who’s ever read me before and ev-
eryone who is interested in these issues of justice and immigration and 
human rights and parity in immigration policy” (Shea 189). Regardless, 
her choice to avoid narrativizing the events of her uncle’s detention 
and death also suggests an awareness that reporting the facts, which 
can be looked up and confirmed, is perhaps more persuasive in such 
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a circumstance. Consider, for instance, the controversy that Rigoberta 
Menchú encountered when it was revealed that she fictionalized some 
of the events of her family’s persecution during the Guatemalan Civil 
War. In particular, Menchú was found to have placed herself at the sites 
of historical events for which she was not present. Though portraying 
herself at sites where family members were tortured and killed was to 
ensure that there was at least a pseudo-witness to the events (Menchú 
111), as Menchú’s experience of being cast a liar shows, the fictionaliza-
tion of real events may have little place in advocacy. By offering only 
documented facts rather than an imagining of what her uncle’s experi-
ences must have entailed, Danticat is able to avoid compromising her 
own ethos amongst those who seek to deny fictionalization a place in 
testimony. The combination of memory, hearsay, and imagination may 
be commonly accepted as autobiography’s means of constructing a rep-
resentation of reality, but when a story serves a larger purpose of human 
rights advocacy, the stakes regarding its credibility grow much higher, its 
truthfulness coming under intense scrutiny.
Importantly, it is only in certain circumstances that Danticat dem-
onstrates this unwillingness to focalize through her uncle’s perspective; 
where she allows access to her uncle’s consciousness and where she does 
not becomes meaningful in this text. A narrative in which Danticat 
felt comfortable entering the consciousness of her uncle, offering his 
thoughts and feelings and even hypothesizing about what he must have 
been feeling, becomes a narrative of minuscule facts, her uncle losing 
his interiority when his last days are depicted. In the parts of the narra-
tive not concerned with Joseph Dantica’s detention and death, Edwidge 
Danticat does not limit herself to merely transcribing her sources’ ac-
counts, nor does she assume that life writing must pursue objectivity 
and an unmitigated representation of the so-called “truth.” Instead, up 
until Dantica’s fateful entry into the United States, Danticat conveys an 
acceptance of the necessary elements of narrativization involved in life 
writing, and by extension, expresses a belief that her uncle’s story (and 
her father’s and her own) is worth sharing, that it will quite possibly 
affect others positively. In these parts of the narrative not concerned 
with her uncle’s detention and hospitalization, Danticat does not drain 
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her narrative of drama and humanity by limiting her story to docu-
mentable fact. She instead positions her audience at the site of events by 
offering an imaginative reconstruction using participants, often Joseph 
Dantica, as focalizers for the action. In these instances, the overtness 
of Danticat’s presence as narrator fades and she allows herself to im-
aginatively enter her characters’ minds, omnisciently conveying the 
story from their point of view. For example, in describing the looting of 
Joseph Dantica’s church, Danticat writes: 
Walking the slippery incline that separated his house from an-
other small courtyard, he kept his face down, his chin as close 
as he could to his chest without blocking his tracheotomy hole. 
He did not dare look back toward the church as a new wave of 
looters brushed past him, heading there. He might have been 
tempted to follow them, to try to stop them, reason with them. 
He thought about all the wounded who might be lying some-
where dying. He thought of their mothers, fathers, standing 
over them unable to do anything but watch. (187) 
Unlike most of her other depictions of events, Danticat mentions no 
source for this particular description. She thereby suggests a willingness 
and ability here to imagine the story of her uncle. She fills in details 
like the slipperiness of the incline using her own familiarity with the 
environment. Other details are born out of logic and assumption: his 
need not to block his tracheotomy hole, his not daring to look back. 
By even offering suppositions about what her uncle “might have been 
tempted” to do and announcing what he “thought,” Danticat imagina-
tively recreates his possible thought-processes, although the accuracy of 
such assumptions is impossible to confirm. Nevertheless, having earlier 
constructed herself as her uncle’s interpreter—his voice when he did not 
have one after his bout with cancer—Danticat’s ability and willingness 
here to channel his consciousness extends from and is rendered believ-
able by her earlier established intimate connection with him. 
However, in conveying Joseph Dantica’s detention in the United 
States, Edwidge Danticat loses and/or chooses to cast aside this ability 
to be a conduit for Dantica’s consciousness. In this part of the narra-
41
Empa the t i c  Engagemen t  i n  Dan t i c a t ’s  Bro th e r,  I ’m  Dy in g
tive, an imagining or dramatization of what her uncle must have been 
thinking or feeling throughout his time in detention and up until his 
death is absent. The diegetic world that Danticat had created complete 
with fully rounded non-fictional characters whose stories Danticat, as 
narrator, assumed the right to narrate, becomes a narrative of expository 
language in which Danticat transmits the findings of the governmental 
investigation. Readers become acquainted with Dantica’s final days in 
factual descriptions: 
At 11:00 p.m., my uncle was given some chips and soda again. 
At 11:45 p.m., he signed a form saying his personal property 
was returned to him. The form lists as personal property only 
his one thousand and nine dollars and a silver-colored wrist-
watch. At 1:30 a.m., I received my phone call. At 4:20 a.m., 
my uncle and Maxo were transported to the airport’s satellite 
detention area[.] (221)
The emphasis on the fact of time replaces any details about the taste 
of the food, the experience of having one’s property gone through and 
catalogued, the disorientation of the whole process. His consciousness 
is no longer one that Danticat enters and chooses to depict for the 
readers. Instead, Danticat merely quotes documents: the transcript of 
Dantica’s interview with the Customs and Border Protection Officer; 
the Discretionary Authority Checklist for Alien Applicants with its “yes” 
and “no” answers; the medical record with notations of temperature, 
blood pressure, and pulse. 
Danticat’s choice not to narrativize her uncle’s experience as a de-
tainee—in fact, to employ, hence draw attention to, the discourse 
frames to which Dantica became subject—in part functions to optimize 
her ethos; she does not necessarily have the freedom to imagine her un-
cle’s experience or focalize the action through his perspective because to 
do so could compromise the credibility of her narrative. Nevertheless, 
even if using an emotional appeal could be effective, as proponents for 
affective citizenship wish, in the case of representing traumatic events 
like those experienced by Dantica, the emotions of such traumas may 
remain largely inaccessible, hence inexpressible. As has been commonly 
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expressed, language fails in the face of trauma; trauma is “beyond lan-
guage in some crucial way” (Gilmore 6). Danticat’s manipulation of 
narrative form towards that which can only curtly report documentable 
facts must then be seen in part as a function of her text’s attempt to 
represent that which is unrepresentable: physical and emotional trauma, 
most directly that of her uncle, but also her own. 
Importantly, Danticat’s shift in style towards minimalistic expres-
sion can be seen as a continuation of her uncle’s own discourse form 
when confronted with traumatic events. His narrative of his escape from 
Haiti, written while on the flight to the United States, features the title 
“Epidemie du 24 octobre 2004” and offers one sentence, “Un groupe de 
chimères ont détruit L’Eglise Chrétienne de la Rédemption,” before de-
volving into a mere listing of material items lost: “the pews, two padded 
ballroom chairs used at wedding ceremonies, a drum set, some speak-
ers and microphones” (214). Similarly, Joseph Dantica had earlier kept 
notebooks regarding the violence in his neighbourhood in which he 
recorded descriptions of the cadavers he would see on his daily walks: 
“Jonas, maybe 20 years old, missing right hand, 11:35 a.m.; Gladys, 
maybe 35 years old, naked, 3:09 p.m.” (139). These brief lists are inad-
equate expressions of the horrors he saw much as Danticat’s list of facts 
regarding her uncle’s death is inadequate. Nevertheless, this inadequacy 
of representation necessarily speaks to trauma’s inherent stilting, if not 
utter silencing, of emotional expression. Such documentable facts as the 
time and quantifiable circumstances of a death may be the elements 
that are actually recordable when to climb inside the reality of such 
trauma, to process it and choose to narrate it, would be overwhelm-
ing and even psychically harmful. As Anne Whitehead observes, trauma 
represents a “collapse of understanding” (5), “causing conventional 
epistemologies”—like self, memory, truth, and linear time—“to falter” 
(5). As such, Danticat’s movement away from representing her uncle’s 
consciousness towards merely listing facts may not simply represent a 
foregrounding of the dehumanizing frames used by the Department of 
Homeland Security. Neither may it represent a lost faith in appeals to 
pathos nor a desire to increase her ethos. It also indicates the incompre-
hensibility of emotion brought on by the experience of trauma.
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Beyond trauma compromising one’s ability to effectively apprehend 
emotion, Brother, I’m Dying illustrates how immigration, more specifi-
cally questions of belonging, can actively cause the censoring of emo-
tions. Describing her childhood self at the American Embassy in Haiti 
awaiting the approval of her visa, Danticat reports having been asked, 
“Do you miss your mother and father?” (105). She writes: 
Sensing that it was the right thing to do, we [she and her broth-
er] both nodded, as if bowing to the flag that our grandfa-
ther had once fought against, that our mother and father had 
now embraced for nearly ten years, that we were about to make 
our own. As my head bobbed up and down, I felt my old life 
quickly slipping away. I was surrendering myself, not just to a 
country and a flag, but to a family I’d never really been part of. 
(105–6)
As this example shows, the complexity of her situation—in part result-
ing from the fraught relationship between the U.S. and Haiti and in 
part resulting from her family’s diasporic condition—upsets expected 
categories of emotion. If given the choice, she might express “hybrid 
emotions” (Eugenides 217), emotions that can house contradiction: 
“Germanic train-car constructions like, say, ‘the happiness that attends 
disaster’” (Eugenides 217). Not only does “miss” not capture the chil-
dren’s emotions, but also the happiness the consulate promises them 
through the approval of their visas—“‘I’m going to make you very 
happy’” (106)—insufficiently describes Danticat’s actual feelings. For 
the child emigrant, emotions are not depicted here as something to 
feel but rather problems to solve. They are something to figure out and 
perform appropriately so as to not betray the true inaccuracy of such 
words and thereby risk disapproval and consequent rejection. In this 
scene, the consulate becomes the one who can regulate Danticat’s emo-
tions; he assumes the power both to dole out her happiness and to make 
her feel that “missing” her parents is the only emotional option. As a 
result, just as the stars of the American flag are pictured in this scene 
as “literally bursting from the corner square, their spiky edges merging 
into the wall” (105), the U.S. comes to represent a force that exceeds 
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its boundaries, infiltrating Danticat’s emotional core in violent penetra-
tion. Danticat’s choice to shift towards documentable fact in her rep-
resentation of Dantica’s detention and death may on one level serve to 
emphasize the inadequacy of language in the face of her uncle’s trauma 
and of her own. But more importantly, it points towards Danticat’s ne-
gotiation of what can and cannot be felt, thereby what can and cannot 
be expressed. 
In other words, one’s compromised agency over emotions speaks to 
an inability to voice one’s own experience freely. Therefore, in part what 
is at stake in the midst of such emotional stilting and censorship is the 
place and power one’s individual story assumes amidst socio-political 
systems that deny individuality. According to the discourse frames avail-
able to Joseph Dantica when he is detained and later hospitalized, his in-
dividualized circumstances do not matter. His death, as represented by 
Danticat, is precipitated by a system that never seeks to know Dantica 
beyond his place within the stereotyped groups of “Haitians” and of 
“asylum seekers.” The system Dantica confronts never questions its 
comprehension of him and thereby neglects individual circumstances 
for the convenience of stereotype, leading Danticat to question, “[w]as 
my uncle going to jail because he was Haitian?” (Brother 222).
A close look at the fabric of post-9/11 U.S. society shines light on 
Danticat’s musing about this racial motivation for her uncle’s deten-
tion. Although not addressed by Danticat specifically, Joseph Dantica’s 
detention and death came just three years after the exposure of concrete 
evidence regarding American discrimination against Haitian asylum 
seekers. On December 3, 2001, the U.S. Coast Guard rescued 167 
Haitian migrants when their boat ran aground in South Florida (Wasem 
7). At that point, the then-INS instituted a secret policy that no Haitian 
“should be paroled without the approval of INS Headquarters” (Bryant 
31).8 The INS only admitted to this secret policy once it was exposed 
by a class-action lawsuit filed on March 15, 2002 (Little, “Statement” 
11). By then, however, its effects were palpable: in November 2001, just 
prior to its implementation, the rate of parole for Haitian asylum seekers 
who had passed credible fear hearings was 96%; between December 14, 
2001 and March 18, 2002, that rate dropped to 6% (Little, “Statement” 
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10). At the same time, rates of parole for non-Haitian asylum-seekers 
remained high at 91% (Conyers 27). The class-action lawsuit offered a 
marginal victory in drawing attention to the issue, even motivating an 
October 1, 2002 hearing on “The Detention and Treatment of Haitian 
Asylum Seekers” chaired by Senator Edward Kennedy. Nevertheless, as 
the lawsuit’s dismissal without a hearing suggests, the United States in 
the wake of September 11th could be more unrestrained with its dis-
criminatory policies, even those that flagrantly contravened commit-
ments to international refugee protocols.9 Furthermore, despite the 
discussion generated by the October 1st hearing, another boat arrival of 
over 200 Haitian migrants on October 29, 2002 (Wasem 2) likely hurt 
the advocacy cause significantly.10 Despite the UN High Commission 
for Refugees declaring that nationality and ethnicity should not be 
grounds for detaining asylum-seekers (Feller, Türk, and Nicholson 
256),11 it is precisely within the context of overt discrimination that 
Dantica’s detention must be weighed. 
In seeking temporary asylum, Joseph Dantica did not just encounter 
an attitude that cast Haitians as unwanted, even dangerous, migrants; 
he also confronted formal policies applicable to all detainees no matter 
their individual circumstances. First, despite his age and valid entrance 
documents,12 in requesting asylum, Dantica was automatically subject 
to mandatory detention.13 Second, and likely specially contributing 
to Dantica’s illness and death, U.S. authorities stripped Dantica of his 
long-term medications and replaced them with others. This was due to 
a policy that required the removal of all “[d]rugs and medications not 
prescribed or authorized by facility medical staff” (U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement 3). According to the Report of Investigation 
regarding Dantica’s death, he had come to Krome with “two prescrip-
tion medications: Hydrea (Hydroxyurea)/50 milligrams, and Valium, 
both of which Dantica said that he took as needed” (Department 8).14 
Despite Dantica’s long-term use of these medications, they were not 
reissued by Krome’s Pharmacy “due to the uncertainty of the medical 
necessity for the medications” (Department 8).15 Consequently, after 
Dantica’s mandatory medical screening, instead of these medications 
being re-prescribed, Dantica “was provided with five-milligram doses 
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of Enalapril to help lower his blood pressure and 250-milligram doses 
of Naproxen to ease the pain and reduce the swelling caused by his 
arthritis” (Department 8). Although there is no way to know whether 
Dantica’s life could have been spared had his medications not been con-
fiscated, Danticat, for one, questions the role this policy played in her 
uncle’s death.16 
Since Danticat criticizes the U.S. immigration system’s inability to 
consider the individual, she herself rightly refuses to rely on generaliza-
tions in her portrayal of the United States. As a cultural construct, the 
United States is neither all good nor all bad in Brother, I’m Dying. Just 
as her childhood view of the American flag brought up a myriad of feel-
ings, as it represents both her historical enemy and her eventual home, 
Danticat allows her memoir to house ambivalences and contradictions 
regarding what the United States means to her and her family. In the 
memoir, the United States is both saviour and killer; it is a place that 
represents family reunion and the cause for family separation. The U.S. 
may have divided Joseph and Mira’s childhood family, their father often 
away fighting against the U.S. occupation of Haiti; it may also have 
brought about Joseph’s eventual death. However, Danticat also read-
ily acknowledges the kindness of individual American people and the 
opportunities provided by the socio-political conditions of the United 
States. For example, Joseph was able to open his church and school in 
Haiti because of American missionaries who “gave him some money 
to help with the building, blackboards, and benches and pledged a 
monthly contribution for a free lunch program for the students” (34). 
Furthermore, when threatened by cancer, Joseph Dantica’s life is spared 
and his voice eventually regained thanks to American medical care and 
the sponsorship from the same American missionaries. Danticat, thank-
ful for the privileges of American medical care, even notes the vast dif-
ferences between her daughter’s “well-monitored” (255) birth in the 
United States and her own birth in Haiti where “no one would have 
noticed” (255) if something had gone wrong. 
By constructing the United States as both a negative and a positive 
entity, Danticat emphasizes that generalizations are ineffective identifi-
ers. Instead, ambivalence, and in fact contradiction, is part of her depic-
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tion of the United States. As such, this dismissal of stereotype serves to 
critique a system that can categorize Joseph Dantica as “Alien” (Brother 
214) and dismiss him, even cause him harm, because of it. 
Although Danticat, in quoting such documents as the transcript of 
her uncle’s INS interview, allows for her uncle’s death to be rendered 
in the discourse frames of the Department of Homeland Security, it is 
important to emphasize that this crafting of narrative form represents 
a choice. While Danticat is constrained in her knowledge of her un-
cle’s last moments, an assumption that infers Danticat had no choice 
but to resort to quoting documents would problematically dismiss her 
authorial control over her narrative construction. Instead, her choices 
regarding narrative form represent an ability to carefully manage sites 
for empathetic engagement. By switching to a narrative perspective that 
foregrounds all she does not know, all that cannot be known about her 
uncle’s experience, Danticat can craft a model for negotiating alterity, 
an ethical model that respects difference. Danticat’s switch in narra-
tive form respects the unknowability of her uncle’s experience, all the 
while lamenting that unknowability. By extension, she can emphasize 
that her uncle’s death was caused by a system that assumed the hubris 
that it could and did know Joseph Dantica, a system that could, for 
instance, declare with no recorded self-consciousness, doubt, or regret 
that Dantica was “faking” (Danticat, Brother 233) his illness despite his 
vomit and altered state of consciousness proving the contrary. 
In addition, as much as Danticat’s choice to quote the records regard-
ing her uncle’s detention and death foregrounds the unknowability of 
his experiences, she significantly does not end her portrait by casting her 
uncle merely an unknowable other. Instead, she constructs a site for the 
possibility of empathetic engagement by providing a scene depicting 
her uncle’s near death years earlier. Directly after the brief notes about 
Dantica’s actual death—“There is no detailed account of ‘the code’ or 
the sixteen minutes between the time he was found unresponsive and 
the time he was pronounced dead, at 8:46 p.m” (239)—Danticat offers 
a narrative of her uncle’s earlier near death from malaria, depicting the 
scene with imagistic detail: “When we walked into his small private 
room, he was curled in a fetal position, and though he was wrapped 
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in several blankets, was shivering. His face was ashen and gray and his 
eyes the color of corn” (240). Beyond the re-emergence of visual details, 
this narrative also suggests the re-emergence of Danticat’s willingness to 
speculate about her uncle’s unexpressed thoughts and feelings. She de-
scribes her uncle as “seem[ing] not to see us. Grunting, he closed his eyes 
as if to protect them from the ache coursing through the rest of his body. 
When he opened his eyes again, he glared at us as if wondering what we 
were doing there” (240). This description’s focus on the “as if ” shows 
that Danticat is again willing to interpret her uncle’s emotions and hy-
pothesize what his actions mean. As such, because of her manipulation 
of narrative order so that this flashback appears directly after the narra-
tion of her uncle’s death, Danticat has allowed her uncle to experience a 
pseudo-resurrection. This resurrection is literal—he, thanks to the order 
of these scenes, returns to life. But this resurrection is also a resurrection 
of his humanity; that Joseph Dantica again becomes a character with 
thoughts and feelings that can be acknowledged and appreciated by an-
other establishes his grievability, hence restoring to him his humanity.
This scene, by extension, lets Danticat re-imagine the loneliness of 
her uncle’s actual death into an image of his family gathered around 
him, consequently enabling a vision of her uncle in more ideal circum-
stances. Beyond this scene’s suggestion of a cathartic replacement of the 
actual with the ideal, the inclusion of this scene has to be considered 
in terms of Danticat’s management of possible sites for an audience’s 
empathetic engagement. As Kathleen Woodward observes, “people are 
more likely to empathize with people who are like themselves” (66). 
Empathizing with Joseph Dantica, the detainee, may prove challeng-
ing for many, both because of the prevalence of stereotyped images of 
detainees and because becoming a refugee oneself may seem incon-
ceivable. Seeing oneself as an ill man, confronting death surrounded 
by family, however, is a more easily imaginable circumstance. Since the 
circumstances of this scene represent a vulnerability that one can easily 
see as one’s own, this scene can more readily lead to an acknowledge-
ment of a collective vulnerability, the kind of awareness of precarity 
that Judith Butler idealizes as an agent for community formation across 
individual differences.
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The pairing of these “death” scenes likewise establishes the ulti-
mate mismatch between the frames of the Department of Homeland 
Security and those of the Dantica(t) family. Whereas the Department of 
Homeland Security’s frames deny the importance of being able to con-
struct and share one’s own personal narrative, the Dantica(t) family, as 
constructed by Edwidge Danticat, holds up personal narrative as vital to 
forming an environment where individuals and communities can thrive. 
The loss experienced by Joseph Dantica’s family proves to be at once 
the literal loss of Joseph Dantica—“the patriarch, the head, of our 
family[,] . . . a father of two and grandfather of fifteen, an uncle to nearly 
two dozen of us, a brother, a friend” (Danticat, “Written Testimony” 
1)—and a loss of ownership over his story and, thus, their own family 
history. Through her choice to quote the official documents, Danticat 
suggests that the story of her uncle’s death no longer exclusively belongs 
to him or to his family. Instead, it belongs more to the authorities who 
have documented his detention and death and who have done so in a 
way that largely strips him of his humanity. To the authorities, Dantica’s 
individual story has no place in their frames for dealing with mass mi-
gration, but the impact of this lost right to one’s own story is emphasized 
particularly by Danticat’s focus elsewhere in the memoir on the impor-
tance of storytelling in self-formation. Throughout the rest of the text, 
the stories about and by one’s ancestors are shown to be a key form of 
inheritance for the latter generations, and thereby a key means through 
which individuals find their places within family and their broader com-
munities. Danticat acknowledges, for instance, that Marie Micheline’s 
stories—like the one of toddler Edwidge and her father bonding over 
butter cookies—function to “assur[e] us that we were indeed loved by 
the parent who left” (54–55). By extension, stories about “the future, 
an undetermined time when my father would send for my mother, Bob 
and me” (55) enable Danticat to conceive of her family as a cohesive 
group despite their current fracture. Danticat’s eventual reunion with 
her parents is even figured in terms of her parents immediately starting 
to tell stories about their children: “muffled laughter coming from the 
next room, as well as the occasional sound of our names. They were al-
ready telling each other stories about us” (116). This coupling of family 
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reunion and the construction of family stories suggests that to possess 
the ability to tell a story about someone is to feel that that person can 
be one’s own. Consequently, Danticat’s choice to quote from documents 
rather than narrativize her uncle’s detention and death symbolizes the ir-
reparable harm done to her family’s sense of cohesiveness. Governmental 
immigration policies interrupt their familial intimacy, taking away from 
them both Joseph Dantica and confidence in their own ability to know 
him and pass along his story.17 As Danticat’s memoir emphasizes, even 
if an individual story—or certain types of individual stories like those 
of immigration detainees in the United States—cannot elicit the empa-
thetic engagement that one might desire from a broad public, such sto-
ries of individuals are vital in the formation, cohesiveness, and stability 
of smaller social groups like families and communities. 
Danticat’s narrative shift towards quoting documentable fact may 
represent an authorial choice, but it is a choice that emphasizes how 
her position in and control over her narrative has been inherently af-
fected by the American border politics encountered by her uncle. As 
Danticat shows, the voicelessness that Dantica experiences becomes her 
own, his precarity expanding to become hers, too. Throughout Brother, 
I’m Dying, Danticat must negotiate the inherent contradictions of her 
discourse space: personalized stories are needed as a means of human-
izing socio-political situations, and yet such appeals to pathos may be 
ineffective; the depiction of emotion is needed also as a means of hu-
manizing, yet governmental systems can either cause the censoring of 
emotional experience or create traumatic situations that compromise 
one’s ability to access and/or express emotion; and finally, individuals 
must be knowable so that empathetic engagement can be achieved and 
yet their unknowability must be respected. These are the rocks and hard 
places that Danticat must navigate. Of course, one might argue that 
Danticat’s text does not do enough to establish Dantica’s experience in 
detention as grievable. Joseph Dantica, as detainee, still remains for the 
most part inaccessible. Nevertheless, although Danticat’s memoir may 
not be able to fully dismantle the frames that cast some individuals and 
experiences as ungrievable, its manipulation of narrative form can serve 
as a critique of these frames. As her memoir demonstrates through its 
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narrative choices, to lose the ability to empathetically engage with an-
other, to no longer become undone by the precarity of someone else, is 
to accept inhumanity in one’s social systems and in oneself.
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Notes
 1 The difference in spelling in Joseph Dantica’s and Edwidge Danticat’s surnames 
is a result of “an error on [Edwidge Danticat’s] father’s birth certificate” (Danti-
cat, Brother 209). 
 2 “Frames,” as conceived by Butler, “seek . . . to contain, convey, and determine 
what is seen” (Frames 10). In other words, much like Burke’s “terministic screens,” 
“frames” function to produce a perceived reality. Butler is most concerned with 
the way certain frames produce a reality in which only particular individuals and 
situations invite grief and only some lives are respected for their precariousness. 
 3 While Berlant roots compassion’s questionable ethics to the “Freudian notion of 
Schadenfreude, the pleasure one takes in the pain of another” (5), Garber elabo-
rates with the following: 
   The problem with compassion begins with its etymology and history. From 
the fourteenth century to the beginning of the seventeenth, the word (deriving 
from Latin com, together, and pati, to suffer) was used to describe both suffering 
together with one another, or “fellow feeling,” and an emotion felt on behalf of 
another who suffers. In the second sense, compassion was felt not between equals 
but from a distance—in effect, from high to low: “shown towards a person in 
distress by one who is free from it, who is, in this respect, his superior.” When the 
first sense fell out of use, which it did fairly quickly, the remaining sense hovered 
between charity and condescension. (20; emphasis in original)
 4 Munro warns that “perhaps reading a book is the easiest way of aligning our-
selves with the contemporary wretched of the earth. The book may be a kind 
of buffer between us and people and situations we could never identify with in 
reality” (207).
 5 My description of the commentary being “dominated” by negative opinions of 
“illegals” is based on impression rather than on a strict classification and tallying 
of the 330 comments. Of course, one would perhaps expect that those viewers 
responding negatively to the story would be the ones most likely to take the time 
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to offer online commentary, but it should be noted that the opinions expressed 
are not uniformly negative. 
 6 Interestingly, even Precarious Life accounted for a certain perceived self-interest-
edness in the public; Butler’s envisioned public, after all, needed to see their own 
precarity in order to appreciate precarity in another.
 7 Of course, Butler’s views regarding the individual are in part informed by the 
discourse frames upon which Frames of War concentrates. As she acknowledges, 
knowing the individual, the “this or that life,” is not always possible, and in fact 
the pursuit of that knowledge could perpetuate the individual’s experience of 
exploitation (Frames 22; emphasis in original). For example, when discussing 
the images of those victimized in Abu Ghraib, Butler acknowledges that inter-
national law protects “the privacy of persons who have been the victims of war 
crimes” (Frames 93). She then must conclude: “Do we lament the lack of names? 
Yes and no. They are, and are not, ours to know” (Frames 95). 
 8 The justification for this change of policy involved claims ranging from the need 
to stop illegal immigration for the sake of national security to a desire to protect 
Haitians from embarking on similar dangerous voyages. As Assistant Attorney 
General Daniel J. Bryant explained the policy, the U.S. government thought 
the change represented a “reasonable step to take in order to protect lives and 
prevent against a potential mass migration to the United States” (31). With 
the harsh promise of indefinite detention, the assumption was that further sea 
entrances to the United States would be deterred and, subsequently, not only 
would the migrant be protected but also the Coast Guard would be able to ful-
fill its role in preventing terrorism rather than being distracted by immigration 
issues. However, the logic of this deterrence method and desire to protect lives 
(both Haitian and American) dissolves amidst the secrecy of the policy—how 
can one deter if the policy is not publically acknowledged? Furthermore, it must 
be noted that this policy was not just applied to those Haitians arriving by water, 
but also to those arriving by air (Little, “Statement” 10).
 9 On May 17, 2002, Judge Jean Lenard, a U.S. District judge, dismissed the case 
ruling that the courts were not the proper place to be seeking help. She asserted 
that “[c]ourts generally must defer to the laws established by Congress and ad-
ministered by the executive branch of government” (qtd. in Wilson n. pag.). An 
appeal of this dismissal was filed to the 11th circuit court, which “issued a short 
opinion adopting the district court’s opinion” (Little, “Responding” n. pag.). 
More specifically, the court ruled that “it was a political question insulated from 
judicial review” (Little, “Responding” n. pag.).
 10 The aftermath of the October 29th arrival of Haitian migrants represents an-
other key blow to the rights of Haitian asylum seekers. On April 17, 2003, 
Attorney General John Ashcroft ruled that David Joseph—an 18 year old who 
arrived on the October 29th boat—did not have the right “to an individualized 
assessment of the need for his detention” despite the fact “[t]here was no allega-
53
Empa the t i c  Engagemen t  i n  Dan t i c a t ’s  Bro th e r,  I ’m  Dy in g
tion that Joseph himself presented any risk to the public” (Human Rights First 
23). The case of David Joseph is a particularly jarring example of the U.S.’s 
systemic prejudice against Haitian migrants. After Joseph was granted bond on 
November 6, 2002 by an immigration judge, the INS appealed the decision 
with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which sided with Joseph’s right 
for parole, dismissing the INS’s appeal stating that “the broad national interests 
invoked by INS were not appropriate considerations for the IJ [Immigration 
Judge] or the BIA in making the bond determination” (Ashcroft 573). Subse-
quently, the case was sent to John Ashcroft by the Under Secretary for Border 
and Transportation Security for review, a process that stayed the ruling of the 
BIA, consequently keeping Joseph imprisoned. Citing the Attorney General’s 
“broad discretion in bond proceedings” (Ashcroft 572) as granted by the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, Ashcroft definitively denied Joseph parole. Subse-
quently, by the time Joseph was at last deported on November 29, 2004—to an 
uncertain future in Haiti where his family home had been destroyed thanks to 
his father’s political views and where his family had subsequently disappeared 
shortly after Joseph arrived in Florida (Charles n. pag.)—he was believed to 
have been the longest held noncriminal Haitian at the Krome detention centre 
(Charles n. pag.). 
 11 The Expert Roundtable of the UN’s High Commission for Refugees made this 
assertion during its November 2001 meeting in Geneva, Switzerland (Feller, 
Türk, and Nicholson 256).
 12 It is believed that Dantica’s valid multi-entry tourist visa—which Danticat testi-
fied would not have expired until 2008 (“Written Testimony” 2)—was deemed 
invalid by the Customs Border Protection official as soon as Dantica requested 
asylum (Posner 1).
 13 Codified by the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996, all asylum seekers entering the United States are placed in detention until 
their “credible fear” hearings where Customs and Border Protection officials de-
termine whether the applicant does possess a “credible fear” that he/she will face 
persecution in his/her home country. Title 8, Section 1235.3(b)(4)(ii) of the 
Code of Federal Regulations states: “Pending the credible fear determination by 
an asylum officer and any review of that determination by an immigration judge, 
the alien shall be detained” (“Inadmissible Aliens and Expedited Removal”).
 14 Family members also insist herbal medicines were confiscated, but such medi-
cines are not listed in any records of Dantica’s possessions. Nevertheless, one offi-
cial, Russ Knocke, is quoted as stating that “Dantica had no ‘legitimate’ medica-
tion on him” (Bracken n. pag.); what was confiscated was “a voodoolike potion” 
(Casimir n. pag.). This statement quickly led to outrage about its dismissive and 
prejudicial nature.
 15 Dantica’s need of Hydrea, in particular, was questioned since it is approved by 
the American FDA only for the treatment of cancer (Department 8).
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 16 Although there is little conclusive evidence one way or another, one might also 
wonder if Dantica’s death was precipitated by the change to Naproxen in treat-
ment of his arthritis. Although one would not expect Naproxen’s side effects to 
affect someone so quickly, the FDA’s Medication Guide does list gastrointestinal 
problems, “ulcers and bleeding in the stomach” (Roche Laboratories 27) as key 
risks. Furthermore, “even at low doses” (Merck n. pag.), Naproxen is said to 
be a special risk to the elderly, causing in particular “peptic ulcers” (Merck n. 
pag.) and other renal and central nervous system complications. Interestingly, 
pancreatitis—Dantica’s official cause of death—is a very rare, though possible, 
complication of Naproxen use, with a less than 1% rate of occurrence (Merck n. 
pag.). 
 17 Shortly after she narrates Joseph Dantica’s death, Danticat offers a story of his 
childhood in which she likewise acknowledges the U.S.’s role in compromis-
ing her knowledge of family history. During the U.S. Occupation of Haiti, the 
family was not to ask questions about the grandfather’s whereabouts, and “[t]
his is why they knew so little of Granpè Nozial’s activities during the U.S. Oc-
cupation. This is why I know so little now” (246). This passage’s connection of 
what “they” did not know with what Danticat herself does not know suggests 
that much as stories can pass a sense of one’s relatives on into the future, a lack 
of knowledge is also something that is inherited and experienced as loss. 
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